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FREEDOM OF LIBERTY TAKES ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ADAMS V. CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT, AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-TERRORISM 
LEGISLATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The events of September 11, 2001, permanently changed the lives of every 
American and placed the federal government—more now than ever before in 
our nation’s history—in the “hot seat” for the responsibility of protecting its 
citizens from terrorism.  Spurred by the nation’s media, Americans wanted to 
know whether the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted 
from failures of technology or overly restrictive laws, and if neither, whether 
the failures resulted from institutional problems in our nation’s intelligence and 
law-enforcement agencies.  Congress and President Bush’s anti-terrorism 
legislation imposes a great number of changes in our national security policies 
and practices, including federal wiretapping regulations.1  However, along with 
these heightened security measures also comes the responsibility of heightened 
civil liability for individual rights, in particular, the right to privacy. 
In the wake of September 11, the country’s attitude toward the 
appropriateness of widespread surveillance seems to have drastically changed.2  
On the belief that increased surveillance is necessary to prevent similar future 
tragedies, President George W. Bush and Congress introduced proposals for 
expanding the powers of federal agents in several important respects, including 
the authority to conduct electronic surveillance.3  The events of September 11 
have also renewed a long-standing national debate about the proper balance 
 
 1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001) [herinafter USA PATRIOT ACT]. 
 2. Cf. Neil Munro & Peter H. Stone, A Tougher Balancing Act, 33 NAT’L J. 2852 (2001) 
(noting how the terrorist attacks will likely lead to demands for increased law-enforcement 
capabilities, particularly in the area of surveillance, and stating that “[privacy] advocates now face 
a potentially insurmountable political problem: a wave of public disgust and fear that will likely 
help boost police budgets and surveillance authority nationwide”); David Barstow, Envisioning 
an Expensive Future in the Brave New World of Fortress New York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, 
at 16 (discussing how attitudes about security are likely to change). 
 3. See Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties: Rights Groups Unite To 
Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (reporting on Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s introduction of a revised and expanded anti-terrorism legislative proposal). 
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between the government’s powers to maintain order and national security and 
its citizens’ Constitutional liberties. 
These conflicting views of freedom of liberty verses an individual’s right 
to privacy typify the debate over the proper balance between granting the 
government authority to maintain order in society and restraining the 
government from intruding on personal liberties.4  It is essential that our nation 
attempt to find and maintain a proper balance given the potential risks facing 
our society, increasingly sophisticated technologies, and our substantial and 
growing dependence on those sophisticated technologies.  Although the new 
anti-terrorism measures are necessary and appropriate in light of the events of 
September 11, it is important to bear in mind that the federal government 
already possesses substantial power and technologies in those areas. 
Underscoring this issue is the recent Second and Seventh Circuit Court 
split.  The Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of Battle Creek5 agreed with the 
Second Circuit and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a 
government entity may be liable in a civil suit under the federal wiretap act, 
also known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-2522.6  With certain exceptions, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act criminalizes and creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting 
electronic communications without a judicial warrant.7  In Adams, through the 
use of a duplicate or “clone” pager and without a warrant, the police 
department tapped the plaintiff police officer’s department-provided pager 
because the department erroneously thought the officer was assisting drug 
dealers.8  In granting summary judgment to defendants, the district court in 
Adams held that certain exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act applied.9  However, these exceptions—the business use and the law 
enforcement exceptions of the Act—required that the clone pager be used in 
the ordinary course of police business.10  Adams turns on what is meant by the 
Act’s use of the phrase “in the ordinary course of business” to create these two 
exceptions to the prohibition against wiretapping.11 
 
 4. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972) 
(“As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine and balance the 
basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the 
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.”). 
 5. Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001). 
 7. Adams, 250 F.3d at 982. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 980. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 982. 
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Section II of this comment will discuss and attempt to explain the case law 
history of wiretapping along with new developments in this area of law, 
including anti-terrorism legislation.  Regrettably, the law surrounding the 
Fourth Amendment as applied to electronic surveillance has scarcely kept up 
with the today’s technological advances.  Section III of this comment will 
analyze the Sixth’s Circuit’s decision in Adams, the Second and Seventh 
Circuits’ split and how those decisions may affect the federal government’s 
liability for heightened wiretapping to prevent terrorism in the United States in 
light of the events of September 11.  Specifically, Section III will analyze three 
of the five major issues in Adams: (1) The meaning of the phrase “other than” 
in the federal wiretapping act; (2) exceptions to liability; and (3) municipal 
liability under the privacy act.12  Adams’ issues of the Fourth Amendment and 
qualified immunity for Defendant Kruithoff are beyond the scope of this 
comment and will not be discussed.13 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. Governing Law of Wiretapping 
1. Case Law 
In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. United States.14  
This was its first ruling on the constitutionality of a modern surveillance 
technology, namely wiretapping.15  Several states, including Washington—
where Mr. Olmstead and his co-conspirators were conducting an illegal liquor 
enterprise—had enacted laws to limit and control wiretapping.16  Federal 
agents installed wiretaps on eight of the suspects’ phones and collected 
extensive evidence of a large conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition 
Act.17  The Court held that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
so long as there was no physical invasion of the target’s premises,18 noting the 
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “material things”19 and the significance of 
physical invasions in prior Fourth Amendment cases.20 
 
 12. Id. at 983-86. 
 13. Id. at 986-87. 
 14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 479-80 & n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing state wiretap statutes). 
 17. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the wiretaps spanned nearly five months 
and during that time the federal agents accumulated 775 pages of notes on conversations). 
 18. Id. at 466. 
 19. Id. at 464 (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the 
person, the house, his papers or his effects.”). 
 20. Id. at 464-65. 
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In 1967 in Berger v. New York,21 the Court found that a New York 
eavesdropping statute that authorized electronic surveillance in certain 
circumstances failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized, and that it therefore allowed electronic 
eavesdropping in a generalized and unconstitutional manner.22  Later that same 
year, the Court decided the dividing line case Katz v. United States,23 which 
rejected trespass as the dispositive factor in warrantless electronic surveillance 
cases and which held that wiretapping was a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.24  The Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places,”25 and reasoned that a warrant was required before law-
enforcement officers could wiretap telephone calls that Katz was making from 
a public pay phone.26 
These decisions explain one reason the courts have been reluctant to grant 
sweeping authority to law enforcement agencies for electronic surveillance—
the recognition that such surveillance is quite intrusive on an individual’s right 
to privacy.  Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the threat to liberty 
inherent in electronic surveillance in its decision in Berger.27  The Court 
referred to electronic eavesdropping as a “dragnet,” in that all conversations, 
even in conversations with persons not even suspected of a crime, would be 
swept in.28 
2. Title III and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
In passing legislation governing wiretapping, Congress recognized 
electronic surveillance techniques are intrusive and can be easily abused.  For 
over three decades, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 (OCCSSA) has governed electronic surveillance for criminal 
investigations.29  Although Title III generally prohibits wiretapping, it creates 
 
 21. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 22. Id. at 58-60. 
 23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 24. The Court explained: 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by 
our subsequent decisions that the “trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be 
regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 353. 
 25. Id. at 351. 
 26. Id. at 353-357. 
 27. Berger, 388 U.S. at 84. 
 28. Id. at 65. 
 29. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-22 (2001). 
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an exception under which law enforcement can legally intercept oral, 
electronic, and wire communications in certain limited situations and under 
strict constraints.30  In enacting Title III, Congress expressly sought to 
accommodate both the need for effective law enforcement and the need to 
protect citizens’ right to privacy.31  To keep the wiretap statute current, 
Congress has subsequently amended Title III several times, the most 
significant of which are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”)32 and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 (“CALEA”),33 making it illegal to intercept communications over 
cordless telephones.34 
Title III was enacted in response to the Berger and Katz line of cases and 
was an attempt to get a handle on the law of wiretapping.35  Title III was later 
divided into three sections by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA).36  The first section governs the interception of communications 
(Title I); the second governs stored communications (Title II); and the third 
governs pen registers (Title III).37  Title I restricts the government’s use of 
electronic surveillance to specific situations and expands the scope of 
protection beyond the Fourth Amendment requirements.  For example, court 
orders for electronic surveillance must be granted only by certain officials, 
cannot be granted in situations where other means for obtaining the 
information have not been tried and requires probable cause and a specific 
 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2001). 
 31. See 801, 82 Stat. at 211.  In enacting Title III, Congress made four findings, the fourth of 
which was: 
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral 
communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the 
interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction 
and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception 
of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of 
offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances that the interception is justified 
and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused. 
Id. at 211-12. 
 32. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 202, 108 Stat. 4279, 4290 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2511 to 
include cordless telephones within Title III coverage). 
 35. See, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083-1167 at 1138. 
 36. Amendment to Title III under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Wiretap Act, 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title I, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2001); Stored 
Communications Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 
(2000); Pen Register Act, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2000). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-22, Titles I, II, and III. 
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description of the place, time and type of communication to be intercepted.38  
Further, electronic surveillance is only permitted for certain crimes and not, for 
example, misdemeanors.39  Because the information is stored by a third party, 
thereby reducing the expectation of privacy, Title II is much less restrictive.40  
Finally, Title III of the ECPA covers pen registers or trap and trace devices, 
which track the phone numbers dialed but not the conversations that took 
place.41  Previous case law provided that pen registers were not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection because a person had no expectation of privacy 
as to the numbers they dialed because they knew the phone company was 
tracking the numbers.42  Title III gave very limited protection against pen 
registers by forcing the government to obtain a court order prior to use, 
although the order is granted on the mere requirement that the use is “relevant 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”43 
3. FISA: Wiretapping and Interception of Electronic Communications 
As apart from domestic crime, the U.S. government needed measures to 
protect itself and its citizens from foreign intelligence and terrorism.  Hence, 
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”)44 
in response to remaining questions about whether surveillance by executive 
agencies in carrying out their national-defense function were covered by Title 
III. 
FISA allows the government’s executive branch to conduct wiretapping for 
national security purposes but still requires authorization to conduct such 
surveillance.45  Requests for wiretaps are reviewed by a seven-member special 
court (the FISA court) under which the Attorney General must show probable 
cause for believing that the wiretap is for intelligence purposes.46  No 
requirement for probable cause for suspecting the commission of a crime was 
required under FISA, however.47  This made the standard for obtaining a 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000), in which an 
internet provider allowed the government access to a subscriber’s computer, leading to the 
discovery of his possession of child pornography.  The search was upheld due to the defendant 
knowingly revealing his IP address to the internet provider.  Id. at 1110. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. §2510-22, Title III. 
 42. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2000). 
 44. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801-1863 (2000). 
[hereinafter FISA]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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warrant under FISA lower than obtaining a wiretap for law-enforcement 
purposes.48 
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court held in United States v. United 
States District Court49 (commonly known as Keith) that the interposition of a 
judge was necessary for surveillance by executive-branch intelligence agencies 
for domestic national security.50  This decision did not mandate the application 
of Title III procedures for such surveillance for domestic national security,51 
and invited Congress to construct other protective procedures.52  Although the 
president’s powers are at their greatest when acting for national security, in 
light of abuses by federal intelligence agencies, Congress requires the president 
to get a surveillance order to conduct a wiretap for national security purposes.53  
While the standard for getting a surveillance order to wiretap for intelligence 
purposes is lower than a surveillance order for law-enforcement purposes,54 
Congress has sought to require some level of accountability of intelligence 
agents. 
In addition, as opposed to the requirements under other wire tap acts,55 
there is no notice requirement under FISA.56  Surveillance under FISA can last 
from 90 days to a year.  Targets of FISA surveillance may find it difficult to 
challenge the legality of the surveillance because the application for the 
surveillance is sealed and not available during discovery.57  For all of these 
reasons, FISA surveillance is considerably friendlier to government than the 
surveillance under the ECPA. 
To balance the potential for abuse,58 Congress set forth several procedural 
safeguards.  FISA requires probable cause for believing that a U.S. citizen was 
an agent of a foreign power—that is, one knowingly engaged in covert 
intelligence gathering activities, prior to surveillance.59  By limiting the strong 
FISA provisions to this narrow purpose, Congress achieved a balance between 
 
 48. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
 49. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 50. Id. at 323-24. 
 51. Id. at 322 (“We do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by 
Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.”). 
 52. Id.  (“Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from 
those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.”). 
 53. FISA, supra note 44. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text. 
 56. FISA, supra note 44. 
 57. Id. 
 58. FISA of 1978 was enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal, which eroded the trust 
of the American people in the executive branch. 
 59. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2000). 
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national security and individual rights.60  Further, FISA limited electronic 
surveillance to situations where the “sole or main purpose” of the surveillance 
was to gather foreign intelligence information.61  Minimization procedures are 
also provided by FISA to reduce the probability that the information sought is 
necessary for the investigation.62 
Still, there exists the possibility that the government could attempt to find a 
way around these limitations by concealing a criminal investigation in the 
cloak of foreign intelligence.  Courts reviewing evidence gathered using a 
FISA search repeatedly upheld the primary purpose requirement, although 
some courts refuse to draw a distinction between foreign intelligence crimes 
and ordinary criminal activities.63  In response to these court decisions, in 1995 
the Attorney General adopted Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and 
the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign 
Counterintelligence Investigations.64  These procedures limited contact 
between the CIA, which in its charter is barred from engaging in internal 
security functions (domestic security),65 and the Department of Justice (DOJ).  
This separation was an attempt to prevent the investigation from appearing or 
actually becoming a criminal investigation, by preventing the Criminal 
Division from “directing or controlling” the investigation.66 
4. Legislative Proposals After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, there was a inundation of legislative 
measures aimed at combating terrorism.67  The foremost issue Congress was 
concerned with was the lack of communication between the FBI and law 
enforcement agencies—due to the fact that it was collectively thought that the 
attacks could have been averted with appropriate collaboration.  Alarmed by 
this haste and lack of thoughtful deliberation,68 legislators and advocacy 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See United States v. Sarkinssian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 64. 1995 Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning 
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Couterintelligence Investigations. 
 65. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1)(2000). 
 66. Id. 
 67. On September 13, the Senate attached an amendment, entitled the Combating Terrorism 
Act of 2001, to an appropriations bill for the Justice Department.  See Senate Amendment 1562, 
147 Cong. Rec. S9401 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001).  Attorney General John Ashcroft introduced a 
more comprehensive legislative agenda, which included nearly identical provisions to Senate 
Amendment 1562, the Combating Terrorism Act.  See Krim, supra note 3. 
 68. Congress was pressured to act quickly on the bill submitted by Attorney General 
Ashcroft.  See Krim, supra note 3 (“The White House is pushing for Capitol Hill to act by the end 
of the week, according to a congressional source.”). 
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groups, both traditionally liberal and conservative,69 challenged the wisdom, 
motives and the constitutionality of certain legislative provisions.  
Nevertheless, in less than two months, Congress enacted and President Bush 
signed into law the USA Patriot Act70 with overwhelming support.71 
The USA Patriot Act72 altered the administrative functioning of several 
other legislative acts, including OCCSSA and FISA.  The most relevant 
changes include Title II, “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures.”73  This Title 
allows the sharing of evidence between law enforcement officers and the CIA 
and includes an expanded role for the Director of the CIA in FISA 
investigations.74  The USA Patriot Act further limits judicial oversight of 
electronic surveillance, allowing roving wiretaps and warrants without 
particulars, including the name and place to be searched.75  Most relevant to the 
FISA court authorization, however, was the change of the “sole or main 
purpose” language in FISA to “significant purpose,”76 a move that lowers the 
burden for the government. 
The USA Patriot Act also contains several provisions that significantly 
changed the law regarding the government’s ability to conduct surveillance.77  
First, the USA Patriot Act makes terrorism a predicate act for which a wiretap 
under Title III of OSSCA can be authorized.78  Second, it modified Title III, 
FISA and the federal statute related to pen registers (a close cousin to wiretaps 
and “bugs,” which collects information about telephone calls placed to and 
from a target telephone, such as the telephone numbers dialed, the duration, 
and the time, for use in investigations and prosecutions of crimes) so that there 
would be explicit legal authorization to permit surveillance of e-mail and 
Internet communications.79  Third, the Act authorizes the use of a “roving 
 
 69. See Krim, supra note 3 (“A coalition of public interest groups from across the political 
spectrum has formed to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration from rushing to enact 
counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on Americans’ privacy and civil 
rights.”). 
 70. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1. 
 71. Jonathan Krim & Robert O’Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New Enforcement Era: U.S. 
Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6. 
 72. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1. 
 73. USA Patriot Act, supra note 1, at § 203(b). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at § 216(a). 
 76. Id. at § 218. 
 77. Krim, supra note 69. 
 78. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 201. 
 79. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at §§ 214, 216. 
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wiretap” under FISA.80  Fourth, the Act lowers the threshold for which 
surveillance pursuant to FISA is permitted,81 and expands the time-periods for 
which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can authorize surveillance in 
the United States of “an agent of foreign power.”82  Fifth, the Act allows for 
so-called “sneak-and-peak warrants,” which permit law-enforcement officers 
to delay notifying a target that a search or seizure has been conducted.83  Sixth, 
the Act also lowers the firewalls that have been erected between law-
enforcement and national-security agencies, by permitting greater sharing of 
information gained through surveillance.84  Finally, the Act subjects several 
provisions to a four-year sunset.85 
In response to the passage of the Patriot Act, the Attorney General 
approved new Intelligence Sharing Procedures to replace the 1995 
Procedures.86  Under the new procedures, the “direction and control” test was 
abandoned in favor of a complete exchange of information between 
 
 80. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 206.  The “roving wiretap” can now be obtained 
upon a showing that “the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting 
the identification of a specified person.”  Id. 
 81. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 218. 
 82. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 207. 
 83. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 213 (statement of Patrick Leahy).  Senator 
Leahy explained sneak-and-peak warrants as follows: 
  Two circuit courts of appeal, the Second and the Ninth Circuits, have recognized a 
limited exception to this requirement [that a person be notified of a search]. When 
specifically authorized by the issuing judge or magistrate, the officers may delay 
providing notice of the search to avoid compromising an ongoing investigation or for 
some other good reason. However, this authority has been carefully circumscribed. 
  First, the Second and Ninth Circuit cases have dealt only with situations where the 
officers search a premises without seizing any tangible property. . . . 
  Second, the cases have required that the officers seeking the warrant must show good 
reason for the delay. Finally, while the courts have allowed notice of the search may be 
delayed, it must be provided within a reasonable period thereafter, which should generally 
be no more than seven days. . . . 
  The bill prohibits the government from seizing any tangible property or any wire or 
electronic communication or stored electronic information unless it makes a showing of 
reasonable necessity for the seizure. . . . Second, the provision now requires that notice be 
given within a reasonable time of the execution of the warrant rather than giving a blanket 
authorization for up to a 90-day delay. What constitutes a reasonable time, of course, will 
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. But I would expect courts to be 
guided by the teachings of the Second and the Ninth Circuits that, in the ordinary case, a 
reasonable time is no more than seven days. 
Id. at S11002-03. 
 84. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 203(b)-(d). 
 85. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 1, at § 224. 
 86. Intelligence Sharing Procedures, March 6, 2002. 
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intelligence and law enforcement.87  Further, the Procedures requested that the 
FISA court remove the minimization procedures in all cases.88 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Adams v. City of Battle Creek 
Adams v. City of Battle Creek89 was brought under the federal wiretapping 
act known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522.90  With certain exceptions, the federal wiretapping act criminalizes and 
creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting electronic communications 
without a judicial warrant.91 Adams raises the question of whether a police 
department may tap a police officer’s pager without a warrant or notice to the 
officer.92 
David Adams, a City of Battle Creek police officer, brought suit against 
the city and a police department employee under § 1983 and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, alleging that interception of pages he received 
over a department-issued pager through use of duplicate or “clone” pager 
violated his rights.93  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary 
judgment to defendants; Adams appealed.94  The Court of Appeals, held that: 
(1) warrantless interception of pages was not made in ordinary course of police 
department’s business, and thus did not come within exception to Act’s 
prohibition on interception of electronic communications; (2) governmental 
entities may be held liable for violations of Act; (3) the court would decline to 
reach constitutional issues raised; and (4) factual issues as to whether city 
could be held liable, and whether department employee was protected by 
qualified immunity, precluded summary judgment.95  The case was affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded.96 
In Adams, it is both clear and accepted that the definition of “intercept” in 
the Act includes pagers within the language “acquisition of the contents of 
any . . . electronic . . . device.”97  The statutes’ definition section for “electronic 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 250 F.3d 980. 
 90. Id. at 982. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 980. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 982. 
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device” creates two “in-the-ordinary-course-of-business” exceptions to wiretap 
liability.98  The scope and meaning of these two exceptions are in need of 
interpretation, because the two exceptions are not exactly clear:99 
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus 
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other 
than - 
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any 
component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of 
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its 
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course 
of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the 
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or 
(ii) being used by a provider of wire of electronic communication service 
in the ordinary course of business, or by an investigative or law 
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties.100 
The first problem the Court found is what the underlined phrase “other 
than” (normally an adverbial phrase) is supposed to modify.101  The Court 
questioned whether it modifies the immediately preceding action “to intercept 
[an] . . . electronic device,” or whether it acts as an adjective, modifying 
“device or apparatus” or does it modify some other action or thought not 
expressed in clear language.102  The second problem the Court found is 
whether the use of “in-the-ordinary-course-of-business” language, as an 
exception, implies, and therefore means, that the tapping of the communication 
is so routine, customary or well accepted that the parties to the tapped 
communication would, should or did know of the tap.103  The court in Adams 
dealt with these two issues of interpretation as set out below. 
1. The Meaning of the Phrase “Other Than” 
The Court found that there is no discussion in the case law of what the 
phrase “other than” in the statutory definition of “electronic, mechanical or 
other device” is to modify.104  The Adams court stated that its dictionary label 
as an adverbial phrase indicates that it is to modify the immediately preceding 
verb phrase “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication,” and found 
that this does not make sense when read with the language that follows it.105 
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The Court reasoned that if “other than” modifies “used to intercept . . . 
electronic communication, “the scope of the “other than” exception would be 
as broad as the statute itself.106  Therefore, this means that “other than” must 
modify the nouns “device or apparatus.”107  The language immediately 
following “other than” is “any telephone or telegraph, or any component 
thereof,” all of which are also nouns.108 The Court reasoned that a better word 
choice than the “other than” phrase probably would have been “excluding” 
because subparts (a) and (b) to § 2510 (5) are exclusions to the main 
definition.109 The Court noted that the cases discussing these exceptions apply 
“other than” this way, and it is the only way that makes sense.110 
2. In the Ordinary Course Exceptions to Liability 
The Court in Adams concluded that the exceptions to liability do not apply 
to this case, and held that both the “ordinary course of business” exception, or 
“business use” exception as it is also called, as well as the law enforcement 
exception, require that the interception of a communication be undertaken by 
employers or law enforcement agencies in the ordinary course of their 
businesses using equipment provided by a communications carrier as part of 
the communications network.111 The Court stated that for this exception to 
apply, a court must find, first, that the equipment used to make the interception 
be “furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by 
the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business . . .§ 
2510(5)(a)(i).”112 Although the plaintiff raised the issue of whether a clone 
pager fits within the definition prescribed in the exception, the Court found it 
clear that the clone pager, a piece of electronic communication equipment, was 
provided to the City by MobileComm, a Bell South company, in the ordinary 
course of its business as a provider of wire and electronic communication 
services.113  The Court found, as did the district court, that the first part of the 
exception is met.114 
The Court held that the second part of the exception requires that the clone 
pager be used in “the ordinary course” of the police department’s business.115  
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“Ordinary course of business” is not defined in the statute, but generally 
requires that the use be (1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine and 
(3) with notice.116 The Court noted there is some disagreement in the case law 
about whether “covert” monitoring can ever be in the “ordinary course of 
business.”117 Although the Court did not find that the statute requires actual 
consent for the exception to apply, the Court held that monitoring in the 
ordinary course of business requires notice to the person or persons being 
monitored.118  The Court held that, because it is undisputed that plaintiff was 
not given any notice that his pager was being monitored, the exceptions cannot 
apply.119 
Most courts interpreting these exceptions have held that advance notice in 
some form is necessary.120  “What is ordinary is apt to be known; it imports 
implicit notice.”121 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,122 employees and former 
employees of a police department, along with friends and family members, 
brought an action against the city, the former police chief, and other members 
of the police department under the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute, 
based on alleged taping of plaintiffs’ personal telephone calls.123 The court 
held that the recording of all calls to and from a police department was routine 
police practice and, thus, took place in the ordinary course of a law 
enforcement officer’s duties for purpose of the exception to liability under the 
federal electronic-eavesdropping statute, regardless of whether police 
employees were aware that particular line was being taped (emphasis 
added).124 
In Bohach v. City of Reno,125 claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment 
and the wiretap statutes, police officers sought to halt an investigation into 
their alleged misuse of the department’s computerized paging system.  The 
police department was retrieving stored messages generated by their pagers.126 
The court held that the officers had no reasonable expectation of privacy when 
the police department warned pager users in advance that their messages would 
be logged on the network.127  The court noted that the police officers did not 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985, 
120 S. Ct. 445. 
 122. Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952. 
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have reasonable expectation of privacy in their use of the computerized paging 
system because all messages were recorded and stored.128  Storage of the 
messages was not due to anyone “tapping” the system but was simply an 
integral part of the technology, which stored messages in central computer 
until they were retrieved by, or sent to, the intended recipient.129  Transmission 
from a user’s keyboard to a computer was essentially electronic mail.130 The 
police chief had notified all users that their messages would be “logged on the 
network,” that certain types of messages were banned from the system, and 
that police stations often record all outgoing and incoming telephone calls.131  
 In Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp.,132 the Fourth Circuit held that recording 
all telephone conversations on certain lines after bomb threats were received 
by the company was not in the ordinary course of business where the 
employees did not receive notice of the recording.133  The court further held 
that there was no unlawful “interception” of a security officer’s conversations 
during the period after the corporation that retained the security firm turned off 
the voice logger on telephone lines with extensions in the security office, even 
though, due to a design defect, a handset microphone remained able to pick up 
ambient noise in the guards’ office and transmit it to the corporation’s security 
control room where employees did not receive notice of the recording.134 
The Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of Battle Creek agreed with the Second 
Circuit and disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a government 
entity may be liable in a civil suit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.  The 
defendants in Adams did not routinely monitor officers’ pagers nor give notice 
to officers that random monitoring of their department-issued pagers was 
possible.135  The Court disagreed with defendants to the extent that they 
contend that Adams impliedly consented to the interception of his pages by the 
clone pager simply because he accepted and used a department-issued pager.136  
The Court stated that the general policy of the department that department-
issued equipment, which includes the pager, was not to be “converted to 
personal use” cannot provide the necessary notice to officers to find consent to 
surreptitious interception of their messages by clone pagers.137  The Court went 
on to state that the so-called policy prohibiting personal use cannot form an 
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after-the-fact justification for intercepting plaintiff’s pager where the policy 
had not been enforced and the department conceded it was aware that pagers 
were used by many members of the force for personal use.138 
The Court did not find any need under the facts presented in this case to 
analyze the “business use” and “law enforcement” exceptions separately.139  
The Court noted that Congress most likely carved out an exception for law 
enforcement officials to make clear that the routine and almost universal 
recording of phone lines by police departments and prisons, as well as other 
law enforcement institutions, is exempt from the statute.140 Such a system 
routinely and indiscriminately records all phone activity in and out of the 
police department.141  This practice is well known in the industry and in the 
general public, and the courts have ruled that even prisoners are entitled to 
some form of notice that such conversations may be monitored or recorded.142 
This point is illustrated in United States v. Paul.143 In Paul, defendants 
were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky, impart based on evidence of their phone conversations, under a 
statute making it unlawful for anyone to introduce, on the grounds of a federal 
prison, anything contrary to the rule of the Attorney General, and they 
appealed.144 The Court of Appeals held that where monitoring of telephone at 
prison took place pursuant to policy statement issued by Federal Bureau of 
Prisons as well as local prison rules, telephone rules were posted, and prison 
inmates had reasonable notice that monitoring of their conversations might 
occur, monitoring took place within ordinary course of correctional officer’s 
duties and was permissible under exception to Title III, permitting interception 
of communications over equipment used by an investigative or law 
enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties and therefore trial court 
did not err in refusing to suppress testimony regarding such monitored 
telephone conversations.145 
Also illustrating this point is United States v. Daniels,146 wherein the court 
held that the provision of the criminal code allowing wiretapping by an 
investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties 
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allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to record an inmate’s telephone 
calls from jail, during which the inmate conducted an illegal enterprise.  Thus, 
evidence obtained by recording did not have to be suppressed in criminal 
trial.147  Further, in United States v. Amen,148 the court held that (1) Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act dealing with wiretapping 
applies to prison monitoring; (2) inmates impliedly consented to interception 
of their telephone calls by using prison telephones when they were on notice of 
the prison’s interception policy from at least four sources; (3) taping of 
telephone conversations made by prison inmates did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment; (4) prison inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and (5) in the prison context, the reasonableness of this search is directly 
related to legitimate concerns for institutional security.149 
3. Municipal Liability Under the Privacy Act 
In Adams, the plaintiff sought to hold both the City and a police 
department employee liable under the wiretapping act.150  The defendants 
raised the question of whether the City is a “person” for purposes of the Act.151 
The Court answered that question by noting that the statute defines “person” as 
“any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political 
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock 
company, trust or corporation.”152 
The Adams court noted that the provision of the Act providing for civil 
liability, § 2520,153 was amended in 1987 and made part of the 1986 Privacy 
Act.154 The amendment added the words “or entity” to those who may be held 
liable under the Act.155  The addition of the words “entity” can only mean a 
governmental entity because prior to the 1986 amendments, the definition of 
“person” already included business entities.156 In order for the term not to be 
redundant, the term “entity” necessarily means governmental entities.157  The 
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Court noted in support of this view that the amendment added the same 
language to the civil liability provision for interception of stored wire and 
electronic communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).158  The Court noted that 
the Senate Committee Report summarizing § 2707, the parallel section for 
liability for intercepting stored communications, specifically states that the 
word “entity” includes governmental entities.159  
The Court based its decision on the amendments to the statute and the 
legislative history behind them, as well as the case law considering the issue, in 
holding that governmental entities may be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.160  
The Court, in finding that a municipality may be liable under the Act, 
concluded that questions of material fact still remain as to who was involved in 
authorizing the interception and how it arose.161 The Court held that summary 
judgment was not appropriate on this issue at that time because the facts were 
undeveloped, and remanded the case to the district court for further 
development of this issue.162 
B. Sixth Circuit’s Dissent in Adams 
Circuit Judge Krupansky concurred in part and dissented in part.163  The 
panel majority reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant-appellees, finding that the electronic monitoring at issue in this case 
did not fall within one of the statutory exclusions provided by the federal 
wiretapping laws.164  In so doing, Judge Krupansky noted, the panel majority 
disregarded the plain language of the controlling statute by imputing a notice 
requirement into the ordinary course of business and law enforcement tests of 
the federal wiretapping laws.165 
Circuit Judge Krupansky noted that David Adams had served as a law 
enforcement officer166 for the City of Battle Creek Police Department since 
1986.167  In conjunction with his position as a law enforcement officer, Adams 
was assigned an alphanumeric pager.168 The police department had given 
Adams a copy of departmental policy which indicated “Department issued 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3597. 
 161. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. 
 162. Id. at 985-86. 
 163. Id. at 987. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  David Adams served as a patrolman until 1993 when promoted to the position of 
detective. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] FREEDOM OF LIBERTY TAKES ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 225 
 
equipment, supplies and uniforms, will at no time be converted [to] personal 
use.”169 The police department had notified Adams that  “[it was] the policy of 
the Police Department to perform regular audits and inspections of all 
department issues equipment.170  These inspections ensure proper maintenance 
and use of all department equipment and supplies.”171  Numerous allegations 
of complicity in drug activity have marked his tenure: (1) in 1989, his patrol 
partner was charged with drug trafficking; (2) a number of informants alleged 
that Adams had protected drug dealers; and (3) Adams had appeared to 
maintain a close friendship with a local drug dealer.172 However, investigators 
had failed to surface substantial evidence of wrongdoing by Adams.173 
Circuit Judge Krupansky dissented because he was persuaded that the 
officers of the City of Battle Creek Police Department monitored David 
Adams’ use of his alphanumeric pager in the ordinary course of its business 
according to the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i), and in the ordinary 
course of exercising their law enforcement duties according to the exception in 
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a)(ii).174 
C. The Second Circuit’s Analysis 
Most courts addressing the issue have held that the 1986 amendments 
indicate that a governmental entity may be liable in a civil suit under the 
Act.175 In Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Department of Justice, bank 
account holders victimized by government seizure of numerous electronic fund 
transfers brought suit against the government and various banks.176  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the 
complaint in its entirety.177 The Court of Appeals held that: (1) government 
entities could be liable for violating the statute regulating access to stored 
electronic information, and (2) remand would be required for additional fact 
determinations as to whether government had been liable in present case.178 
The Court in Organizacion stated that the government did not violate 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act by seizing electronic wire transfers of 
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funds claimed to have been obtained from illegal drug transactions and held 
that no required “interception” had occurred because no “device” as defined 
under Act had been used.179 The court also held that government entities are 
subject to liability under the statute regulating access to certain stored 
electronic records.180 
In Conner v. Tate,181 a citizen brought an action against a county, county 
officers and woman who allegedly unlawfully accessed and taped private 
telephone and voice mail communications between the citizen and the 
woman’s former husband, seeking damages for alleged violations of federal 
and state wiretap statutes and Electronic Communications Privacy Act.182 The 
county moved to dismiss, and county officers moved for partial judgment on 
the pleadings.183 The district court held that governmental entities are 
amenable to suit under the civil liability provisions of federal wiretap statutes 
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act authorizing civil damages for 
unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, oral or electronic 
communications.184 
The court held that as defined in federal wiretap statutes, the term “person” 
does not include governmental agencies, and therefore government entity 
cannot be prosecuted criminally for violation of wiretap statutes and that the 
statutory language is the starting point for interpreting the meaning of a 
statute.185  If the statutory language being interpreted is ambiguous, the court 
may look to the legislative history and the overall statutory scheme.186 
The court went on to state that a county could be held civilly liable for 
violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.187  The court held that 
the complaint failed to state a civil damages claim against the county for 
violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, given that the complaint 
did not allege that the county accessed the electronic communication service 
illegally, and allegations that a third party somehow obtained capability to 
access and record messages from voice mail systems and pager memories of 
the plaintiff and the third-party’s husband did not permit inference that access 
was acquired with assistance of county police officers to whom recordings 
were later allegedly disclosed.188 
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In PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department,189 the police 
officers union and individual officers sued the township, township police 
department, former and current police directors, former mayor and the 
telephone company alleging that electronic listening and taping devices were 
covertly placed in certain areas of police headquarters and on building phone 
lines resulting in unlawful interception of police officers’ private conversations 
in violation of United States Constitution, New Jersey and Federal Wiretap 
Acts, and New Jersey common law.190 On defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment, the district court held that: (1) the police officers did not have 
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations which took place over 
“beeped” telephone lines; (2) the police officers could not recover damages for 
humiliation, mental pain and anguish under New Jersey Tort Claims Act; (3) 
the union had no standing to bring claim; and (4) the police director was a 
“policy-making official” for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983.191 
The district court held that telephone conversations which were recorded 
covertly in police headquarters were “wire communications,” within the 
meaning of both the Federal Wiretap Act and the New Jersey Wiretap Act, and 
thus, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard did not govern claims; 
wire communications, unlike oral communications, were generally protected 
regardless of whether the person making or receiving such communications 
had an expectation of privacy.192 The court stated that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard of Katz193 was highly relevant to claimed 
interceptions of the police officers’ oral conversations by means of 
surreptitious recording in police headquarters in violation of both Federal and 
New Jersey Wiretap Acts.194  “Person,” in the definitional section of the federal 
wiretap statute, includes government employees but does not include 
governmental bodies themselves.195 “Entity,” within the meaning of the federal 
wiretap statute authorizing recovery from a person or entity that violates 
statute, refers to governmental entities; thus, governmental entities such as the 
township and police department were subject to liability under the Federal 
Wiretap Act.196  “Person,” within the meaning of the New Jersey Wiretap Act, 
does not include governmental bodies; thus, the township and police 
department could not be subject to liability under the New Jersey Wiretap 
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Act.197  Lastly, the court stated that in determining what construction to give to 
the New Jersey Wiretap Act, the court must weigh the fact that the Act was 
closely modeled after and made to substantially parallel the Federal Wiretap 
Act.198 
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis 
Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled to the contrary, holding that a 
governmental entity may not be found liable in a civil suit under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.199 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,200 the court 
based its hasty decision to exempt governmental entities from liability under 
the Act solely on the plain language of the definition of “person” in the statute, 
which does not expressly include governmental entities.201  The court did not 
deal with the meaning of the word “entity.”202 Finding no ambiguity, the court 
refused to look to the legislative history.203 However, the court in Adams 
looked to the legislative history in order to give meaning to the word “entity,” 
which was added to the definition in 1987.204 
The Amati court specifically held the following: (1) Exception to liability 
under federal electronic-eavesdropping statute that exists for eavesdropping by 
an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties 
is not limited to situations in which express notice is given to people whose 
conversations are being listened to;205 (2) for purpose of the exception to 
liability under federal electronic-eavesdropping statute that exists for 
eavesdropping by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary 
course of his duties, the term “ordinary” is properly interpreted to refer to 
routine noninvestigative recording of telephone conversations, not to use of 
wiretapping that occurs in furtherance of an investigation;206 (3) recording of 
all calls to and from the police department was routine police practice and thus 
took place in the ordinary course of a law enforcement officer’s duties for the 
purpose of exception to liability under the federal electronic-eavesdropping 
statute, regardless of whether police employees were aware that particular line 
was being taped;207 (4) the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute does not 
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forbid all nonconsensual electronic eavesdropping, but it does require a 
warrant for electronic eavesdropping that is not within one of the exclusions;208 
and (5) the federal electronic-eavesdropping statute does not allow for suits 
against municipalities.209 
E. Author’s Analysis 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act seeks to balance citizens’ 
privacy rights and law enforcement needs while keeping in mind the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and 
seizure.210  Congress has made the Act the primary means by which to address 
violations of privacy interests in the communications field.211  Bearing this in 
mind, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Adams, Second 
Circuit and Seventh Circuit’s decisions may have grayed the lines defining this 
balance—especially in light of the consequences of Congress and President 
Bush’s new anti-terrorism legislation. 
The Sixth Circuit in Adams correctly agreed with the Second Circuit and 
correctly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in holding that a government 
entity may be liable in a civil suit under the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act.  The Court properly found that Adams turns on what is meant 
when the Act uses the phrase “in the ordinary course of business” to create two 
exceptions to the prohibition against wiretapping.212 The Court’s reasoning that 
the statutes’ definition section for “electronic device” creates two “in-the-
ordinary-course-of-business” exceptions to wiretap liability213 was correct.  In 
finding that the exceptions do not apply to this case, the court correctly held 
that both the “ordinary course of business” exception and the law enforcement 
exception require that the interception of a communication be undertaken by 
employers or law enforcement agencies in the ordinary course of their 
businesses using equipment provided by a communications carrier as part of 
the communications network.214 The Court relied on the fact that “ordinary 
course of business” is not defined in the statute, but generally requires that the 
use be (1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine, and (3) with notice.215 
Adams’ majority correctly reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant-appellees, finding that the electronic monitoring at 
issue in this case did not fall within one of the statutory exclusions provided by 
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the federal wiretapping laws.216  In so doing, the panel majority disregarded the 
plain language of the controlling statute by imputing a notice requirement into 
the ordinary course of business and law enforcement tests of the federal 
wiretapping laws.217 
Circuit Judge Krupansky dissent is not persuasive in that he argued that he 
was convinced that the officers of the City of Battle Creek Police Department 
monitored David Adams’ use of his alphanumeric pager in the ordinary course 
of its business and in the ordinary course of exercising their law enforcement 
duties.218 
The majority of the courts addressing this issue in the Second Circuit have 
correctly held that the 1986 amendments indicate that a governmental entity 
may be liable in a civil suit under the Act.219  Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United 
States Department of Justice220 held government entities could be liable for 
violating the statute regulating access to stored electronic information.221  In 
Conner v. Tate,222 the district court held that governmental entities are 
amenable to suit under the civil liability provisions of federal wiretap statutes 
and Electronic Communications Privacy Act authorizing civil damages for 
unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, oral or electronic 
communications.223  The court held that as defined in federal wiretap statutes 
the term “person” does not include governmental agencies, and therefore a 
government entity cannot be prosecuted criminally for violation of wiretap 
statutes.224  Conner held that a court may look to the legislative history and the 
overall statutory scheme if the statutory language being interpreted is 
ambiguous.225 In PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department,226 held 
that “entity,” within the meaning of the federal wiretap statute authorizing 
recovery from a person or entity that violates the statute, refers to 
governmental entities; thus, governmental entities such as a township and a 
police department were subject to liability under the Federal Wiretap Act.227 
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Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled to the contrary in that it indicates that a 
governmental entity may not be held liable in a civil suit under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.228 In Amati v. City of Woodstock,229 the court 
based its hasty decision to exempt governmental entities from liability under 
the Act solely on the plain language of the definition of “person” in the statute, 
which does not expressly include governmental entities.230 The court did not 
deal with the meaning of the word “entity.”231  Finding no ambiguity, the court 
incorrectly refused to look to the legislative history.232 Is this to say the 
Seventh Circuit believes the government is above the law? 
In opposition to Amiti, the court in Adams looked to the legislative history 
in order to give meaning to the word “entity,” which was added to the 
definition in 1987.233 The Adams court noted that the provision of the Act 
providing for civil liability, § 2520,234 was amended in 1987 and made part of 
the 1986 Privacy Act.235  The amendment added the words “or entity” to those 
who may be held liable under the Act.236  The addition of the words “entity” 
can only mean a governmental entity because prior to the 1986 amendments, 
the definition of “person” already included business entities.237 In order for the 
term not to be redundant, the term “entity” necessarily means governmental 
entities.238  The Court correctly noted in support of this view that the 
amendment added the same language to the civil liability provision for 
interception of stored wire and electronic communications under 18 U.S.C. § 
2707(a).239 The Court relied on the Senate Committee Report summarizing § 
2707, the parallel section for liability for intercepting stored communications, 
which specifically states that the word “entity” includes governmental 
entities.240 
F. Consequences of Anti-terrorism Legislation on Case Law 
On November 18, 2002, the United States Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review reversed a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
 
 228. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. 
 229. 176 F.3d 952. 
 230. Adams, 350 F.3d at 985. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2001). 
 235. Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3597. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
232 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:207 
 
Court decision241 involving the application of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA).242 The government, as the sole litigant, appealed a decision by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the FISA court) that set limitations on 
orders authorizing electronic surveillance of an “agent of a foreign power.”243  
The FISA court’s goal was to ensure that law enforcement officials do not use 
the electronic surveillance provisions of FISA for the unlawful purpose of 
furthering a criminal investigation, rather than for the intended purpose of 
protecting against foreign intelligence.244 In reversing the FISA court’s 
decision, however, the Review Court found that the foreign intelligence 
element need not be the “primary purpose” for the search, but rather could be a 
mere “measurable purpose” of the search.245 The court reached its conclusion 
based on the language in FISA as passed by Congress in 1978,246 prior to the 
amendment by the USA Patriot Act of 2001.247 This conclusion reverses years 
of court decisions, is in conflict with the Fourth Amendment, and opens the 
door to abuse of FISA’s authority. 
The restriction of “primary purpose” prevents abuses of FISA and gives 
the federal government a guide for selecting targets for wiretaps.  This new-
found absence of such restrictions invites abuse.  For example, wiretapping 
targets could easily become politically motivated.  Although it is 
understandable in the wake of September 11, 2001, to want to grant as much 
discretion as possible to the government to prevent future terrorism attacks, the 
desire for safety from outside entities must be tempered with a desire for safety 
from governmental abuses of civil liberties. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In concluding that government entities may be held liable in a civil suit 
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the court in Adams delved 
into the circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits.  Agreeing with 
Second Circuit and disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Adams Court has 
basically adopted expanded definitions of “person” and “entity” under the Act 
by analyzing the statute’s intent and legislative history.248 
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While Adams correctly held that government entities may be held liable for 
violations of the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, we 
certainly have not seen the last of this issue.  The circuit split between the 
Second and Seventh Circuits, as well as the recent reversal of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court decision249 involving the application FISA, 
leaves many issues open for debate and adjudication.  In the wake of 
September 11, 2001, America’s war on Afghanistan, our strong likelihood of 
war with Iraq, and the new developments in anti-terrorism legislation, there is 
a strong possibility that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act could be 
expanded further to include a jump from municipal government liability to 
federal government liability for violations of the Act. 
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